Concerning (cooperative) minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) games, I suggest the following readings:

Bird C.G. (1976) On cost allocation for a spanning tree: a game theoretic approach. Networks, 6, 335-350.
(*the seminal paper about mcst games*)

Feltkamp V., Tijs S., Muto S. (1994) On the irreducible core and the equal remaining obligations rule of minimum cost spanning extension problems. CentER DP 1994 nr.106, Tilburg University, The Netherlands.
(*the first paper proposing a cost allocation protocol, namely the ERO-rule, for mcst situations based on the Kruskal's algorithm*)

Branzei R., Moretti S., Norde H., Tijs S. (2004) The P-value for cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree situations. Theory and Decision, 56, 47-61.
(*another axiomatic characterization of the ERO-rule*)

Bergantiños G., Vidal-Puga J.J. (2007) A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems. Journal of Economic Theory, 137, 326-352.
(*still another nice reformulation and reinterpretation of the ERO-rule, P-value...*)

Tijs S., Branzei R., Moretti S., Norde H. (2006) Obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree situations and their monotonicity properties, European Journal of Operational Research, 175, 121-134
(*a class of cost allocation protocols for mcst situations including the P-value and satisfying cost monotonicity*)

Moretti S., Tijs S., Branzei R., Norde H. (2008) Cost allocation protocols for supply contract design in network situations. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research. DOI:10.1007/s00186-008-0226-9
(*another class of cost allocation protocols based on the Kruskal's algorithm including the class of obligation rules*)

Norde, Henk, Stefano Moretti, and Stef Tijs. "Minimum cost spanning tree games and population monotonic allocation schemes." European Journal of Operational Research 154.1 (2004): 84-97.
(*an algorithm to find a pmas on mcst games*)

Online phd thesis on cooperative mcst games:

Feltkamp V., (1995) Cooperation in controlled network structures. PhD Dissertation, Tilburg University, The Netherlands.
https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/1210953/3955629.pdf

Moretti, S. (2008). *Cost allocation problems arising from connection situations in an interactive cooperative setting*. CentER, Tilburg University.
https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/1028522/Thesis_Version_2.0.pdf

Some references on strategic connection situations:

Feltkamp, V., Tijs, S., & Muto, S. (2000). Bird's tree allocations revisited. In *Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory* (pp. 75-89). Springer US.
(*a strategic game based on the Bird rule is presented, see also the thesis of Feltkamp listed above*)

Escoffier, B., Gourvès, L., Monnot, J., & Moretti, S. (2012, October). Cost allocation protocols for network formation on connection situations. In *Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools*

(VALUETOOLS), 2012 (pp. 228-234). IEEE.
http://basepub.dauphine.fr/bitstream/handle/123456789/11834/Valuetools_protocol.pdf?sequence=1
(*the model presented during the course*)

Gourvès, L., & Monnot, J. (2008). Three selfish spanning tree games. In *Internet and Network Economics* (pp. 465-476). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
(*alternatives models of strategic games in connection situations*)